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agreed that the natural father should be 
considered the primary source for child 
support and recognized that caution must 
be exercised when imposing child support 
liability on a non-biological father. In ad-
dition the dissent, like the majority, be-
lieved that an estoppel may arise even 
when there is no intent to mislead, if the 
actions of one party cause a prejudicial 
change in the welfare of another. How-
ever, the dissent disagreed with the ma-
jority's reasoning that financial detriment 
is the only type of detriment, such being 
the sole reason the majority denied the ap-
plication of equitable estoppel. Id. at 541, 
510 A.2d at 556. 
The dissent concluded that emotional 
detriment should be sufficient to establish 
the element of detriment, and the facts in 
Knill supported a finding of emotional 
detriment. /d. at 547, 510 A.2d at 559. In 
light of the circumstances in Knill, the dis-
sent observed the duration of the husband's 
representations to determine whether a true 
paternal relationship developed between 
Charles and Stephen. Moreover, the frus-
tration of the realistic opportunity to dis-
cover and establish a relationship with the 
natural father was considered. Finally, the 
dissent noted the devastating effect on a 
child's welfare where a long established 
paternal relationship has been breached 
resulting in the child being proclaimed a 
bastard and left without a father. The dis-
sent ultimately determined that detriment 
was in fact established, and therefore 
Charles should have been precluded from 
disavowing parental responsibility for 
child support. Id. at 554, 510 A.2d at 560. 
In Knill, the court stated that since stat-
ute of limitations no longer exist in pa-
ternity suits Cledythe could maintain a suc-
cessful paternity action against Stephen's 
natural father. Furthermore, even though 
Charles knew Stephen was not his son, the 
conduct which he demonstrated was con-
sistent with Maryland's public policy of 
strengthening the family unit. Maryland 
encourages such conduct so long as it does 
not interfere or deprive the child or mother 
of the right or opportunity to seek legal 
support from the natural father. 
In Maryland, as in the majority of other 
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, 
a husband may not be equitably estopped 
from denying child support to an illegiti-
mate child. In Knill, a case of first impres-
sion, the dissent would have considered 
whether the paternal relationship did, in 
fact, exist. The end result in Knill is that 
Charles Knill, who voluntarily assumed 
the role as a father, has no legal duty to 
support Stephen. But in the final analysis 
Stephen will suffer the "ultimate humilia-
tion of having no support from a man who 
for all purposes was his father for fourteen 
years." Brieffor Appellee at 6. 
- William James Momson, III 
United States, Petitioner fJ. American 
Bar Endowment et al.: SUPREME 
COURT FINDS CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATION'S INSURANCE 
PROGRAM TAXABLE 
The Supreme Court recently upheld a 
tax assessment by the IRS against the 
American Bar Endowment (ABE) concern-
ing income received from an insurance 
plan made available to its members. In 
United States, Petitioner v. American Bar 
Endowment et al., 106 S.Ct. 2426 (1986), 
the Court decided two issues related to the 
particular plan. First, whether income de-
rived from the insurance plan constituted 
"unrelated business income" subject to tax 
under § § 511 through 513 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code), 26 U.S.C. §§511-
513, and second, whether the members 
who participated in the plan could claim a 
charitable deduction for those premium 
payments which amounted to dividends 
on behalf of the ABE. 
The ABE is a corporation exempt from 
taxation because it is "organized and oper-
ated exclusively for charitable ... or edu-
cational purposes." 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3). 
In order to fund its charitable work, the 
ABE provides group insurance policies to 
its members. By purchasing insurance as a 
group, the ABE has bargaining power that 
an individual would lack. Furthermore, 
the cost of the insurance to the group is less 
because it is based on the group's claims 
experiences instead of general actuarial 
tables. Normally, the cost of this plan to 
the insurance company is less than the 
premiums paid by the ABE, thereby en-
titling the ABE to a "dividend." Instead of 
dispersing the amount of the dividend 
among the participating members, the 
ABE retains the whole dividend amount to 
aid its fund-raising efforts. Members are 
required to agree to this arrangement as a 
condition to participation in the insurance 
plan. They have also been advised by the 
ABE that relinquishment of the dividend 
constitutes a tax-deductible contribution 
to the ABE, thereby making the after-tax 
cost of the insurance, "less than the cost of 
a commercial policy with identical coverage 
and premium rates." 106 S.Ct. at 2429. 
The ABE was assessed a tax deficiency 
after an audit by the IRS in 1980. Its insur-
ance plan was considered an "unrelated 
trade or business" such that any profits 
realized were subject to tax. 26 U.S.C. 
§§51l-513. The ABE paid the taxes as-
sessed, and then brought an action in the 
Claims Court for a refund after all admin-
istrative remedies had been exhausted. In-
dividual participants who had not yet 
taken a deduction for the excess premiums 
paid brought an action for refunds as well. 
The two suits were consolidated for trial in 
the Claims Court. 
The Claims Court found in favor of the 
ABE in its suit, holding that its insurance 
plan did not constitute a "trade or busi-
ness" for purposes of the tax. The court's 
conclusion was based on the following four 
factors: 
(1) The program was developed as a 
means of raising funds for the 
ABE's educational efforts. 
(2) The program's success in generat-
ing dividends evidenced noncom-
merical behavior. 
(3) Together, participants could change 
the program to reduce premiums. 
(4) The ABE was not in competition 
with other non-charitable com-
panies because it did not under-
write or act as a broker. 
In the individual respondent's action, the 
court held that they had failed to show that 
the insurance was purchased at a greater 
price ''with the intention that the excess be 
used to benefit a charitable enterprise," 
and were thus denied a charitable deduc-
tion. 4 Cl.Ct. 415 (1984). On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the Claims Court 
as to the ABE, but reversed and remanded 
the decision as to the individual respon-
dents for further fact-finding. The Su-
preme Court granted the Government's 
petition for certiorari on both issues. 
I. In a six to one decision, the Court held 
that the insurance program offered by the 
ABE constituted a trade or business for 
purposes of the unrelated trade or business 
tax. By definition, the Code sets up a three-
part test for determining whether a trade 
or business carried on by a tax-exempt or-
ganization should be taxed. In its discus-
sion, the Court found that the ABE's in-
surance program is regularly carried on, 
that it is not substantially related to the 
purpose of the ABE's tax-exempt status, 
and that its activity is both "the sale of 
goods" and "the performance of services." 
Thus the three-part test is satisfied. Fur-
thermore, the program possesses the char-
acteristics of services provided by other 
entities for a profit. After this initial con-
clusion, the Court went on to strike down 
three of the four factors relied on by the 
Claims Court in its holding. 
As to the program's success in generating 
dividends, the Court found this to be a 
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result of monopoly pricing based on the 
unique asset available to the ABE-its 
members who possess "highly favorable 
mortality and morbidity rates." 106 S.Ct. 
at 2429. In discussing the third factor-
that the participants could collectively 
change the nature of the program - the 
Court looked at the agreement itself which 
requires assignment of the dividend as a 
condition to participation in the program. 
The Coun rejected the argument that the 
assignment was voluntary because mem-
bers could change the policy at any time, 
stating that the Claims Court had put too 
much weight on such an unsubstantiated 
argument. Finally, the Court held that the 
ABE's program was "an example of pre-
cisely the son of unfair competition that 
Congress intended to prevent" by enacting 
the unrelated business income tax. 
If the ABE's members may deduct pan 
of their premium payments as a char-
itable contribution, the effective cost 
of ABE's insurance will be lower than 
the cost of competing policies that do 
not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if 
ABE may escape taxes on its earnings, 
it need not be as profitable as its com-
mercial counterpans in order to re-
ceive the same return on its invest-
ment. Should a commercial company 
attempt to displace ABE as the group 
policyholder, therefore, it would be at 
a decided disadvantage. 
106 S.Ct. at 2432. The only factor in the 
ABE's favor was that the insurance plan 
was consistently presented as pan of its 
fund-raising effort. However, the Court 
felt that this factor could not stand alone as 
a basis for ovenurning the assessment by 
the IRS. 
II. The Court upheld the finding of the 
Claims Court regarding the individual 
participant's claim for a charitable deduc-
tion. The fact that the respondents received 
a benefit from their contribution did not 
automatically make the premium payments 
non-deductible. Had any of the claimants 
demonstrated that the contributions were 
purposely made "in excess of the value of 
any benefit" received in return, then some 
deduction may have been allowed under 
§ 170 of the Code. However, none of the 
respondents in the action offered any proof 
that similar policies could have been pur-
chased for a lower cost. Such a lack of proof 
led the Coun to assume "that the value of 
ABE's insurance to those taxpayers at least 
equals their premium payments." 106 
S.Ct. at 2434. Thus, no charitable motiva-
tion could be found by the Coun. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens' 
main argument concerned the viability of 
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the Court's analysis regarding the ABE 
program and its effect on unfair compe-
tition. In focusing his argument on the 
Coun's failure to justify its conclusion 
with any concrete evidence, Justice Stevens 
remarked, 
The trial judge scoured the record for 
evidence pointing to a harmful effect 
on competition and found none (foot-
note omitted). The absence of evidence 
in the record, rather than the Coun's 
ruminations about possibilities and 
likelihoods, should control our analy-
sis. 106 S.Ct. at 2436. 
Justice Stevens went on to refute the Court's 
other findings regarding the panicipants 
involuntary assignment of the dividends, 
the taint of a monopoly by the ABE, and 
the lack of a factual basis behind the char-
itable panicipation of the members, con-
cluding that the decisions of the coun of 
appeals and the claims court were correct. 
The decision in United States, Petitioner 
v. American Endowment et al., represents 
yet another clarification' of the Internal 
Revenue Code; this time affecting mem-
bers of the legal community because of the 
Court's interpretation of what constitutes 
a trade or business for purposes of the un-
related business tax. 
- Barbara E. Wixon 
MacDonald v. Yolo County: THE 
SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES 
THE CONCEPT OF INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
WITHOUT COMPENSATION HAS 
OCCURRED. 
In MacDonald v. Yolo County, 54 
U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1986) (No. 
84-2015), the Supreme Coun of the United 
States in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice 
Stevens reaffirmed Agins v. City of Ti-
buron, 447 U.S. 225 (1980), in holding 
that absent knowing the nature and extent 
of permitted development, the Coun can-
not adjudicate the constitutionality of a 
regulation that propons to limit it; in es-
sence because limiting intense develop-
ment does not prohibit all economic use of 
the land sought to be developed. 
In 1975, appellants submitted a tenta-
tive subdivision map to the Yolo County 
Planning Commission and County Board 
of Supervisors proposing to construct 
a 159-home subdivision on land which 
was in part a corn field. Both the Yolo 
County Planning Commission and the 
County Board of Supervisors, appellees, 
rejected the subdivision plan. The Board 
based their rejection on what they con-
sidered numerous factors "inconsistent 
with the General Plan of the County of 
Yolo, (and) the specific plan the County of 
Yolo embodied in zoning regulations for 
the County." MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 
4782. These included: 1) the lack of access 
to and from the subdivision to a public 
street; 2) no provision for public sewer ser-
vice by any government entity; 3) inade-
quate police protection for the subdivi-
sion; and 4) no provision for water or 
maintainance of a water system by any 
governmental entity. Id. 
As a result of the Board's decision, the 
appellants claimed inverse condemnation 
and sought a declaratory judgment and 
monetary relief. 
Inverse condemnation exists when a 
governmental entity restricts land use 
through regulation, such as by prohibiting 
development, but does not condemn the 
land thereby removing the landowner's 
remedy of just compensation. Agins, 447 
U.S. at 255. The appellants accused the 
Board of "restricting the propeny to an 
open-space agricultural use by denying all 
permit applications, subdivision maps, 
and other requests to implement any other 
use, and thereby of appropriating the 'en-
tire economic use' of [ their] propeny 'for 
the sole purpose of [providing] ... a pub-
lic, open-space buffer.'" MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4782. Appellants concluded 
that the Board's ruling on the regulations 
denied any beneficial use of their prop-
eny, thus it was an unconstitutional taking 
without just compensation, or inverse con-
demnation.ld. at 4783. 
The California Superior Coun sustained 
appellees demurrer citing the alternative 
uses appellants could make of their land 
under the Yolo County Code §§8-2.502, 
.503. Id. Quoting Agins, the Coun con-
cluded that "irrespective of the insuffi-
ciency of the appellant's factual allegations, 
monetary damages for inverse condemna-
tion [based on land use regulations] are 
foreclosed .... " MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. 
at 4783. 
The California Coun of Appeals affirmed 
the superior coun's application of Agins 
where monetary damages for inverse con-
demnation are not permitted in California. 
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4783. The 
court stated that a landowner cannot re-
cover "in inverse condemnation based 
upon land use regulation." /d. In funher 
tying the facts in this action to that in 
Agins, the coun offered that the only rem-
edy available to appellants would be to set 
